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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE LIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONAL




During the last several decades concentrated efforts have been made to set
aside the death penalty as unconstitutional under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments of the Constitution.' The high point in this challenge was reached
in Furman v. Georgia,' which, although echoing some of the arguments of the
opponents of capital punishment, did not take the virtually irreversible step of
declaring the death penalty unconstitutional per se.
The death penalty issue was presented to various state courts following
Furman and ultimately reached the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia,' where
the Court issued a rather emphatic "no" to the question of whether the death
penalty is cruel and unusual per se, at least for the crime of murder.'
The question now arises: Is the Gregg decision a logical consequence, or a
complete reversal, of the Court's stand in Furman? In order to address this issue
four areas must be examined: (1) the import of the Furman decision, including
an analysis of the arguments and plurality opinions; (2) the responses of selected
states to Furman; (3) the Gregg decision in the light of Furman; and (4) both
Gregg and Furman in the context of constitutional history. The relevant argu-
ments of both sides will be examined, and an attempt is made to demonstrate that
Gregg and Furman are not only in harmony with each other, but that they fit
into the concert of constitutional evolution.
II. The Key Opinions in Furman v. Georgia
In Furman v. Georgia,' the Court, instead of upholding or outlawing the
death penalty per se, sidestepped the question and issued a per curiam opinion,
supplemented by five separate concurring opinions in the plurality and four
separate dissents. The plurality held, for a variety of reasons, that the "imposition
and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual
* This article was originally prepared under a grant from the National Endowment for
the Humanities for a 1976 Summer Seminar entitled: Freedom and Responsibility in the
American Tradition: Two Centuries of Constitutional Government, under the direction of
Henry J. Abraham, Henry L. and Grace Doherty Professor, Woodrow Wilson Department of
Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia. The author wishes to express appre-
ciation to each of these.
** Associate Professor of History and Government, Reinhardt College, Waleska, Georgia.
1 For an account of the struggle prior to 1970, see M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL;
THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973).
2 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
3 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
4 Decisions in cases before the Court involving the death penalty for rape were carried
over to the Fall 1976 term. One might surmise from this that the Court is not yet firm on the
question of whether death for rape is a disproportionate penalty.
5 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman which involved murder was decided in conjunction
with two other death penalty cases involving rape, Branch v. Texas and Jackson v. Georgia.
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punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."'
Only two of the justices in the plurality, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice
Marshall, clearly agreed that the death penalty was cruel and unusual per se.
Both of their opinions follow very closely the arguments advanced on behalf of
the petitioners in the briefs prepared by the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund
For example, Mr. Justice Brennan found the death penalty violative of the
concept of human dignity on the basis of four principles which were all enunci-
ated in the Legal Defense Fund briefs:
Death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong
probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary society
is virtually total; and there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal
purpose more effectively than the less severe punishment of imprisonment.
The function of these principles is to enable a court to determine whether
a punishment comports with human dignity. Death, quite simply, does not.8
Mr. Justice Marshall dealt with several arguments including: deterrence, the
encouragement of guilty pleas, eugenics and economy.' He reasoned that:
Despite the fact that abolitionists have not proved non-deterrence
beyond a reasonable doubt, they have succeeded in showing by clear and
convincing evidence that capital punishment is not necessary as a deterrent to
crime in our society.' 0
If the death penalty is used to encourage guilty pleas and thus
deter suspects from exercising their rights under the Sixth Amendment to
jury trials, it is unconstitutional."'
... [A]ny suggestions concerning the eugenic benefits of capital punish-
ment are obviously meritless.
12
As for the argument that it is cheaper to execute a capital offender than
to imprison him for life, even assuming such an argument, if true, would sup-
port a capital sanction, it is simply incorrect.'
3
Justice Marshall also claimed that the death penalty is excessive and un-
necessary, as well as immoral; that it is purposeless vengeance which is "imposed
6 Id. at 239-40 (emphasis added). The constitutionality of the death penalty for rape was
carried over to the 1976 Fall term.
7 In the words of the NAACP lawyers, the issues were:
The death penalty is no part of the regular criminal law machinery of Georgia
or of the nation. It is a freakish aberration, a rare extreme act of violence, visibly
arbitrary, probably racially discriminatory-a penalty reserved for wholly arbitrary
application because, if it were regularly used, it would affront universally shared
standards of public decency.
Such a penalty - not Law, but Terror - is the instrument of a totalitarian
government. It is a cruel and unusual punishment forbidden under the Eighth
Amendment.
Brief for Petitioner, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, cited in 73 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 375 (P. Kurland & G. Casper,
eds. 1975).
8 408 U.S. 305 (Brennan, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 342 (Marshall, J., concurring).
10 Id. at 353.
11 Id. at 355.
12 Id. at 356.
13 Id. at 367.
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discriminatorily against certain identifiable classes of people"; that "there is
evidence that innocent people have been executed before their innocence can be
proved"; and that "the death penalty wreaks havoc upon our entire criminal
justice system."' 4 He concluded that if the average citizen were cognizant of "all
the facts presently available regarding capital punishment, [he] ...would . ..
find it shocking to his conscience and sense of justice. For this reason alone
capital punishment cannot stand."'"
The opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall reflect the major arguments
of the opponents of capital punishment. But in finding capital punishment un-
constitutional per se, neither Justice was in harmony with the other three Justices
in the plurality.
Mr. Justice Stewart found that although the death penalty "is unique in
its total irrevocability .. . in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a
basic purpose of criminal justice . . . and . . .in its absolute' renunciation of all
that is embodied in our concept of humanity . .. [it was] ...unnecessary to
reach the ultimate question" of its constitutionality per se. 6 Indeed, he argued
that this was precisely so because the statutes under review had "not ordained
that death shall be the automatic punishment for murder."' 7 In other words,
the very fact that the Georgia and Texas laws did not provide for mandatory
sentences for particular crimes rendered the question of constitutionality per se
outside the scope of the issue at bar.
Justice Stewart argued that the death sentences in these cases were arbitrary,
i.e., they were cruel and unusual in the same way that "being struck by lightning
is cruel and unusual," since, out of the myriad of persons convicted of rapes and
murders in 1967 and 1968, "petitioners are among a capriciously selected
handful" who received the death sentence.' "[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly im-
posed."' 9
Although strongly influenced by the ideas contained in petitioners' briefs,
Justice Stewart did not totally embrace their position. He concluded that the
death penalty was not unconstitutional per se, for he recognized society's legiti-
mate need for retribution:
I cannot agree that retribution is a constitutionally impermissible ingredient
in the imposition of punishment. The instinct for retribution is part of the
nature of man, and channelling that instinct in the administration of criminal
justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society
governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is un-
willing or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they
"deserve," then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante
justice, and lynch law.
14 Id. at 358-69.
15 Id. at 369.
16 Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
17 Id. at 308.
18 Id. at 309, 310.
19 Id. at 310.
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The constitutionality of capital punishment in the abstract is not, how-
ever, before us in these cases .... 11
Mr. Justice Douglas reveals in his opinion the influence of the arguments
based on discrimination, especially racial discrimination, in the imposition of the
death penalty.2 Douglas concluded that the discretionary statutes in question
were unconstitutional as applied. He implied that a mandatory death sentence
might be constitutional but avoided the question since he claimed it was not at
issue. The import of Furman for Douglas is that it requires
legislatures to write penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and non-
arbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that general laws are not ap-
plied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups.
22
Mr. Justice White also concluded that the question of the unconstitutionality
of the death penalty per se was not before the Court, that only the narrower
question of the constitutionality of the capital punishment statutes of the states at
bar was at issue. In the development of his opinion he appears to be the least
influenced, of those in the plurality, by the arguments contained in petitioners'
briefs. He seems most concerned with the impact of the infrequency of the im-
position of the death penalty and with the practice of resting sentencing authority
primarily in juries.
He tacitly affirmed a number of the arguments of the retentionists: that the
death penalty may be an appropriate one for certain crimes; that, indeed, it may
be deserved by the perpetrator; that society is permanently protected from further
crimes perpetrated by those executed; that a general need for retribution exists;
and that society's need for specific deterrence might be valid reasons for the death
penalty were it not "so rarely invoked."2
With regard to the practice of rare invocation5 Justice White concludes:
[S]eldom-enforced laws become ineffective measures for controlling human
conduct and... the death penalty, unless imposed with sufficient frequency,
will make little contribution to deterring those crimes for which it may be
exacted.
25
Regarding jury discretion, Justice White appears to think that the practice
20 Id. at 308.
21 It would seem incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is
"unusual" if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth,
social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the
play of such prejudice....
Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
In a Nation committed to Equal Protection of the laws there is no permissible
"caste" aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of judges and
juries in imposing the death penalty enables the death penalty to be selectively
applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lack-
ing in political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and
saving those who by social position may be in a more protected position.
Id. at 255.
22 Id. at 256.
23 Id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 311-12.
25 Id. at 312.
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of vesting sentencing authority in juries, in order to mitigate the law through com-
munity involvement, has encouraged in excessive jury leniency, resulting in jury
refusals to order the death penalty. Therefore, by implication, decisions on
sentencing should be vested elsewhere.
The short of it is that the policy of vesting sentencing authority primarily
in juries-a decision largely motivated by the desire to mitigate the harshness
of the law and to bring community judgment to bear on the sentence as
well as guilt or innocence--has so effectively achieved its aims that capital
punishment within the confines of the statutes now before us has for all
practical purposes run its course.
26
Indeed, although Justice White concurred with the plurality of the Court
that in the instant cases the death penalty was constitutionally infirm, a careful
reading of his opinion in Furman indicates that he would have held existing laws
constitutional if two conditions had been met: first, if the death penalty had been
imposed more often; secondly, if the decision process had been removed from
the jury so as to eliminate the possibility of jury intransigence in refusing "to im-
pose the death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the crime."
27
In general, then, the plurality in Furman echo the sentiment of the opponents
of the death penalty as contained in petitioners' briefs, but only Justices Brennan
and Marshall adopt the position that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional.
Also, if capital punishment is to be allowed in any case, "juries and judges can
no longer be permitted to make the sentencing determination in the same manner
they have in the past."2 8
III. State Response to Furman
The most perplexing question facing those who attempted to analyze and
respond to Furman was this: what made the death penalty unconstitutional in
those particular cases? In attempting to answer this question, there were three
ways to perceive the Court's ruling in Furman. First, capital punishment was
unconstitutional per se; second, existing capital punishment statutes providing
for discretion of judge or jury in determining sentences were unconstitutional;
third, existing capital punishment statutes providing for unguided discretion of
judge or jury in determining sentences were unconstitutional. Accordingly, the
following alternatives were available to various state legislatures. First, abolish
capital punishment; second, enact new capital punishment laws providing for
mandatory death sentences for specific categories of crimes; third, enact new
capital punishment laws providing for objective guidelines to aid the judge or
jury in determining if, in a given case, capital punishment is justified.
Significantly, very few of the jurisdictions affected by Furman chose to
exercise the first option. At the time of Furman, nine states had abolished the
death penalty, generally through legislative action, the last taking place in 1965.9
26 Id. at 313.
27 Id. at 314.
28 Id. at 397 (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
29 The following states have abolished the death penalty prior to Furman; Alaska (1957),
Hawaii (1957), Iowa (1965), Maine (1887), Michigan (1847), Minnesota (1911), Oregon
(1964), West Virginia (1965) and Wisconsin (1853). See California Legislative Report 38-
40 (March 9, 1960).
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In addition, during the legal process which culminated in the Furman decision,
California, one of the states involved in the cases at bar, abolished capital punish-
ment by action of the state supreme court." Following Furman, thirty-five states,
as well as Congress, redrafted capital punishment statutes. Discounting the nine
states, which prior to Furman had legislatively prohibited capital punishment,
there were six jurisdictions without capital punishment statutes as of the Gregg
decision. One of these statutes has been declared unconstitutional by the state
supreme court." Two passed death penalty legislation in 1973, only to be vetoed
by executive action."2 And the post-Furman action of two states was still un-
certain."
Following Furman, a majority of the affected jurisdictions enacted new
death penalty legislation. These states chose to take one of three forms of legis-
lative action: impose mandatory death penalties for certain categories of crimes; 4
draft statutes which offer guidelines for sentencing; 3 or enact "quasi-mandatory"
statutes.30
Fifteen to nineteen states adopted "mandatory" statutes. At least five states
adopted "quasi-mandatory" statutes, which attempted to reduce the discretion
involved in weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, requiring death
sentences only when there were aggravating but no mitigating circumstances
30 People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 405
U.S. 983 (1972). This holding was short-lived, however, as the California Constitution was
soon amended through the initiative referendum process to authorize capital punishment. See
Rand, Death - California Style: Reviewing the Constitutionality of the State's New Capital
Punishment Law, 3 U. SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REV. 145 (1974).
31 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 113-4 (1969).
32 Massachusetts and South Dakota.
33 These states are Kansas and North Dakota. See KAN. STAT. § 21-4501 (1974); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 (Special Supp. 1975). North Dakota is sometimes listed as an
abolitionist state as of 1915, but does retain the death penalty for murder by a lifer. See
Hailer, Capital Punishment Statutes after Furman, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 670 n.85 "(1974);
California Legislative Report, supra note 29, at 38-40; New York Times, July 3, 1976, § 1, at
7, col. 7, 8.
Even in the nine states which had prohibited capital punishment, six had post-Furman
capital punishment bills introduced into their legislatures. None, however, became law. These
states were: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, and West Virginia.
34 These statutes have been declared unconstitutional by Woodson v. North Carolina, 96
S. Ct. 2978 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).
35 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S PROJECT ON MINIMUIM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROPOSED MODEL PENAL CODE (1974). This has been recently upheld
in Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976).
36 See, e.g., Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes,
87 Harv. L. Rev. 1710 (1974).
37 See DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (Supp. 1976);
IND. CODE § 35-13-4-1 (1975); KY. REV. STAT. § 507.020 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:30 (West Supp. 1977); MD. PENAL CODE ANN. Art. 27, § 413 (Supp. 1976); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 97-3-19, 97-3-21, 97-25-55, 99-17-20 (Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
94-5-105 (Special Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
630:1 (Special Supp. 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 60.06 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 §§
701.1-701.3 (1976-77) (repealed); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE §
16-52 (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2402, -2406 (1975); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-10,-31
(1975); WYO. STAT. § 6-54 (Supp. 1975). See also 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 670, 671 n.86; 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1710 n.140, 1711 nn.143-50; Washington Post, July 3, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 7. How-
ever, Montana, Nevada, Tennessee and Wyoming are described as having based their laws on
the Model Penal Code, which allows guided discretion. See Thornton, Florida's Legislative and
Judicial Responses to Furman v. Georgia: An Analysis and Criticism, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
109 (1974). The variation in count is due partly to the differing interpretations of "quasi
mandatory" and partly to incomplete data available.
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present." In general, however, the majority of the states chose some form of
mandatory sentencing procedure despite the fact that Furman perhaps gave hints
that this might not be an acceptable solution.
Ignored by those states which opted for mandatory statutes was Justice
Douglas' focus in his opinion in Furman on the phrase "untrammelled discretion"
of juries, as opposed to discretion per se. In addition, these states pushed aside
the commonsense argument that discretion is inherent in the system and the
attempted elimination of jury discretion would not remove "random selection"
and/or "caprice" from the system. Indeed, discretion is an integral part of the
criminal justice system from arrest to post-sentence executive action, including
review by the United States Supreme Court. 9
In addition, these states ignored the Chief Justice's comment which exposed
the dichotomy inherent in "all out" mandatory provisions:
I could more easily be persuaded that mandatory sentences of death,
without the intervening and ameliorating impact of lay jurors, are so
arbitrary and doctrinaire that they violate the Constitution.
40
The Chief Justice, in line with traditional perceptions of criminal justice,
reasoned that while in theory murder is a capital crime deserving of death in
every instance, in the practical application of the law accommodation
must be made to varying circumstances by allowing for the possibility of differing
sentences tailored to the criminal as well as to the crime. Thus, while mandatory
laws have been instituted in an effort to eliminate arbitrariness and caprice, these
laws have the contrary effect of insuring arbitrariness by failing to allow for the
necessary exercise of proper discretion.
Those states which perceived Furman as calling for guided discretion, on
the other hand, drafted statutes designed to eliminate "untrammelled" discretion.
This proved to be a more enlightened interpretation of Furman as evidenced by
the recent Gregg decision.
IV. The Consistency of Gregg with Furman
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Powell and Stevens, delivered the opinion
for the Court in Gregg v. Georgia." The Court held that capital punishment
for murder is not unconstitutional per se;4" on the contrary, it may be imposed
under the eighth and fourteenth amendments if appropriate safeguards are
38 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1, 209, 219 (West Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§
53a-25, -35(b), -46a, -54b (Supp. 1977); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.02-2929.04 (Page
1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1121 (Purdon 1964); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19-03(a)
(1974). See also LeMaster, The Eighth Amendment and Kentucky's New Capital Punishment
Provisions-Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop, 63 Ky. L.J. 408 (1975); 87 HARV. L. REv,
1709 n.132.
39 See, e.g., Ehrhardt, The Aftermath of Furman: The Florida Experience, 64 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIINOLOGY, 284 (1975); LeMaster, supra note 38, at 409-13; Mackey, The Inutility
of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note, 54 B.U.L. REV. 30 (1974); Weyl,
Supreme Judicial Court and the Death Penalty: The Effects of Judicial Choice on Legislative
Options, 54 B.U.L. REV. 181 (1974).
40 408 U.S. at 402 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
41 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).




established. The Court advanced some fundamental premises in support of its
decision.
First, capital punishment is not "excessive" if it does not involve unnecessary
or wanton pain, nor can it be disproportionate to the crime if it is to comport with
the evolving standards of decency implicit in the eighth amendment."
Second, the legislature property has the burden of selecting punishments for
various crimes and the Court found that it is not required to choose the least
harsh penalties possible in each case."
Third, constitutional history of the United States supports the retention of
capital punishment per se. 5
Fourth, contemporary standards of decency are perhaps best measured by
legislative action. The argument that current standards under the eighth amend-
ment require the abolishment of capital punishment per se has been eroded by
the fact that since Furman, Congress and 35 states have reinstated the death
penalty and juries have imposed death sentences on some 460 persons since
Furman."
Fifth, capital punishment comports with human dignity, a concept vital to
the eighth amendment, so long as it satisfies basic penological justifications, viz.,
retribution coupled with the further possibility of deterrence of capital crimes by
potential offenders. Both are constitutionally permissible considerations for
legislatures in devising capital punishment statutes.7
Sixth, the death penalty for murder is not invariably a disproportionate
penalty."s
Justice Stewart relied on the arguments put forth by the dissent in Furman,
specifically those articulated by Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger. 9
Justice Stewart concedes that retribution is a legitimate goal of penology," a
position he strongly supported in Furman." Similarly, Justice White had in-
dicated in Furman that retribution is a legitimate goal of society, though he
believed that the infrequent imposition of the death penalty impedes the attain-
ment of that end.2
Justice Stewart, however, reemphasized that the severity and irrevocability
inherent in the death penalty demand special precautions by the Court.53
Justice White, moreover, implicitly recognized in Furman the awesome nature of
the death penalty, and apparently agreed that the eighth amendment imposes
some special obligations to protect against constitutional abuse. Justice White's
43 Id. at 2925.
44 Id. at 2926.
45 Id. at 2927.
46 Id. at 2928-29. These were the statistics as of March 1976. At the time Gregg was
handed down, 611 persons in 30 states were under sentence of death. See New York Times,
July 2, 1976, § 1, at 7, col. 7-8.
47 96 S. Ct. at 2930-32.
48 Id. at 2932.
49 In the body of the relevant section of the opinion, Justice Powell's Furman opinion
is cited six times, Chief Justice Burger's five times, Justices Stewart and White are each cited
three times and Justices Brennan and Marshall each once.
50 96 S. Ct. 2930.
51 See 408 U.S. at 452-54 (Stewart, J., concurring).
52 See Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
53 96 S. Ct. at 2932-33. See 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
54 See 408 U.S. at 313-14 (White, J., concurring).
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emphasis on the judicial obligation of supervision was explicitly adopted in Gregg
and is presumably the basis for the refusal to declare the death penalty uncon-
stitutional per se?5;
Gregg also deals with the concern expressed in Furman that jury discretion
could allow for arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. Gregg
interpreted these concerns to mean that this constitutional infirmity could be met
by a carefully drafted statute ensuring that the sentencing authority, preferably
in a bifurcated proceeding, is presented with adequate information which focuses
on the circumstances of the specific crime and the character of the individual
defendant."
Gregg cites from Furman the opinions of Justices White and Stewart in
pointing out the difficulty of guiding jury decisions on whether to impose the
death penalty." The lack of adequate guidelines in the statutes under examina-
tion in Furman resulted in arbitrariness and caprice in the sentence selection
process.5"
Justice Stewart adamantly focused on the arbitrary nature of pre-Furman
death penalty imposition while Justice White did so implicitly, stressing the in-
frequency of imposition and execution. What distinguishes Gregg from Furman
in this respect is that the statute under examination in Gregg had devised an
adequate means of controlling the necessary exercise of jury discretion. The
55 96 S. Ct. 2925-26.
56 Id. at 2935. This was amplified by Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2969 (1976).
57 See 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
58 96 S. Ct. 2932. In Furman both Justice Douglas (concurring) and Chief Justice
Burger (dissenting) discussed the holding in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971),
that the time-honored practice of allowing a jury in a capital case to impose the death
penalty without any governing standards was not a denial of due process under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Furman, however, held that such "untrammelled" jury discretion
was a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporating the
eighth amendment.
59 Since the Georgia capital punishment statute that was upheld in Gregg is likely to
become a model for other states, an analysis is appropriate. The new act reestablished the
bifurcated trial which was in effect at the time of Furman. In addition, it provided that at
the pre-sentence hearing
the judge [or jury] shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation,
and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal con-
victions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere . . . or the absence of any
such prior convictions and pleas; [p]rovided, however, that only such evidence in
aggravation as the State has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be
admissible. The judge [or jury] shall also hear arguments by the defendant or his
counsel and the prosecuting attorney, as provided by law, regarding the punishment
to be imposed.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-25503 (Supp. 1976).
Section 3 of the Georgia statute provides for the "mitigating and aggravating" circum-
stances to be included in the judge's charge to the jury, prior to its deliberation on sentence.
Also, these circumstances may be considered by the judge himself in case of a bench trial.
In all cases of other offenses [not including aircraft hijacking or treason in
which the death penalty is mandatory] for which the death penalty may be author-
ized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for
it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise
authorized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which
may be supported by the evidence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a
person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder
was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal
convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while
the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or aggravated
battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the
[April 1977)
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Court cites constitutional history as the main justification:
We have long recognized that "[flor the determination of sentences, justice
generally requires ... that there be taken into account the circumstances of
the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender." G°
Jury sentencing evolved as a response to the conviction that decisions on
commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of
a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the
purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or
solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of
his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder
as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
an aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections em-
ployee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from,
the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful confinement, of himself or another.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1976).
The Georgia legislature and the Georgia courts focused on the Furman decision's emphasis
on discretion and arbitrariness and inferred that the proper alternative was discretion that was
not "untrammelled" but rather was guided as objectively as is humanly possible. In judging the
constitutionality of the statute, the Georgia Supreme Court said:
The essential question is not whether our new death statute permits the use of some
discretion, because admittedly it does, but, rather, whether the discretion to be
exercised is controlled by clear and objective standards so as to produce non-dis-
criminatory application. After all, some discretion is inherent in any system of
justice, from arrest to final review . .. Logically, it is not discretion per se which
must be condemned, but it is unguided discretion that does not produce "evenhanded
justice."
Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615-16 (1974). Coley involved challenges
to Georgia's rape statute. However, in House v. State, 232 Ga. 140, 265 S.E.2d 217 (1974),
the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the post-Furman murder statute with
reference to the grounds delineated in Coley.
The state supreme court further stated that Georgia's new capital punishment laws were
designed to overcome the "arbitrariness" assailed in the Furman opinions. The Court articulated
four aims of the statute tailored to this end. The statute:
t (1) substantially narrows and guides the discretion of the sentencing authority
to impose the death penalty and allows it only for the most outrageous crimes and
those offenses against persons who place themselves in great danger as public servants.
(2) provides for automatic and swift appellate review to insure that the death
penalty will not be carried out unless the evidence supports the finding of one of the
serious crimes specified in the statute.
(3) requires comparative sentencing so that if the death penalty is only rarelyimposed for an act or it is substantially out of line with sentences imposed for other
acts, is will be set aside as excessive.
(4) [requires the Georgia Supreme Court] to make certain the record does not
indicate that arbitrariness or discrimination was used in the imposition of the death
sentence.
231 Ga. at 834, 204 S.E.2d at 616. The Georgia Supreme Court also noted that the Supreme
Court of Florida in a five to two decision reached the same conclusion respecting the consti-
tutionality of Florida's new death statute, which, as drawn, is remarkedly similar to that of
Georgia. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). On Florida's response to Furman, see
Note, Florida Death Penalty: A Lack of Discretion?, 28 U. MIAMa L. REV. 723 (1974); 2 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 108 (1974).
60 96 S. Ct. 2932, quoting Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).
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punishment, especially in capital cases, should reflect the feeling of the com-
munity. Prior to Furman, juries were traditionally charged by the judge as to
sentencing procedures, and this often involved no more than outlining the possible
penalties.
Gregg took particular note that the Furman concerns were satisfied in that
capital punishment can only be imposed after a separate hearing after guilt has
been decided, in which there must be specific findings by the jury regarding the
circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant. In addition, there
was provision in the Georgia statute for mandatory review of death sentences by
the state's supreme court. The review is designed to protect against error by the
jury in determining aggravation, and to insure comparability of each death
sentence with similar cases.6 This should ensure that a particular death sentence
is not disproportionate to the circumstances involved in the case.
These procedures are envisioned by the Court as providing a remedy for
Justice White's objection in Furman that there is "no meaningful basis for dis-
tinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not." 2 It might also satisfy his implied objection that too few
death penalties are returned too seldom.
In the pre-Furman years, aggravating circumstances were brought out in the
course of the testimony, in the district attorney's summary, or in the pre-sentence
hearing. But now, relevant circumstances, some of which, prior to the bifurcated
trial, would not have been admissible, will be included in the judge's charge to
the jury on sentencing. In that way pertinent aggravating circumstances will be
before the jury in written form, a medium that is more concrete and more graphic
than mere collective memory.
It was also contended in Gregg that the "arbitrariness and capriciousness
condemned by Furman continue to exist in Georgia-both in traditional practices
that still remain and in the new sentencing procedures.. ."" In other words, if
that statute was not unconstitutional on its face, it was at least unconstitutional
in its application.
The concern with arbitrariness and capriciousness in the application of the
pre-Furman law was a fundamental concern of Justice Stewart in that case. In
meeting petitioner's objections to traditional discretion in the Georgia judicial
process, at the prosecutorial, jury, and executive levels, the Court held that
Furman was aimed at limiting arbitrariness at a specific point of procedure, not
in eliminating it altogether. 4 Regarding the possibility of arbitrariness or caprice
involved in jury determinations, the Court held that in any case where the de-
fendant might be adversely affected, the determinations of the jury were subject
to efficacious check by review of the Georgia Supreme Court, which review
"serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty."' :;
61 Id. at 2937.
62 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
63 96 S. Ct. at 2937.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 2940. Justice White's concurring opinion substantially supports the Court's
opinion, dwelling in more detail on the inherent necessity of discretion in the system and on the
invalidity of petitioner's claims. See id. at 2947-49. The Court apparently ignored petitioner's
contentions with regard to discretionary arbitrariness in executive action.
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The constitutionality of Georgia's post-Furman capital murder statute demon-
strates that the pivotal justices in Furman (especially Justices Stewart and White,
who had indicated their opposition to infrequent, arbitrary, and discriminatory
imposition of capital sentencing procedures) were opposed to unguided jury
determinations, not to jury discretion in and of itself. In Gregg, Justices Stewart
and White, along with the majority, found these objections were successfully
overcome by the precautions built into the Georgia law which limited jury dis-
cretion but did not purport to remove it entirely. Thus, an examination of Gregg
v. Georgia in light of Furman v. Georgia demonstrates that there is no ap-
preciable inconsistency between them.
V. Furman, Gregg and Constitutional Evolution
One last question to be addressed is the consistency of Furman and Gregg
with prior constitutional evolution. Two separate, but closely related issues are
involved: first, the Court's pronouncements on the State's right to take life as a
punishment; second, the Court's holdings as to what constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment."6
Until Gregg, the question of per se constitutionality of capital punishment
under the eighth and fourteenth amendments had not been addressed by the
Court. As we have seen, the Court sidestepped the issue in Furman, ultimately to
decide it in Gregg. However, these are not the only cases in which the Court has
spoken on this point.
In the past the Court has employed a number of devices to avoid the question
of constitutionality per se, which had been raised in several cases. In Rudolph v.
State, 7 it denied certiorari. In Witherspoon v. Illinois,8 McGautha v. Cali-
fornia,9 and Furman, it effectively limited certiorari to issues which did not raise
the question of constitutionality per se; and in Boykin v. Alabama7 ° it found other
grounds on which to reverse. However, whatever tre method employed to avoid
the issue, the Court had implicitly upheld the constitutionality of the death
penalty.
In addition, in those cases in which the Court upheld the constitutionality
of various methods of execution,7' the justices sanctioned sub silento the principle
that the state has the ultimate right to take life. Moreover, the Court specifically
held in Williams v. Oklahoma that the death penalty was not a violation of the
due process clause.72
In some fairly recent decisions various members of the Court have expressed
approval of capital punishment. In Trop v. Dulles,7 the plurality opinion written
by Chief Justice Warren and joined by four other justices, stated in dictum:
66 A third issue, that of jury discretion, has such a brief constitutional history that it is
dealt with in connection with the analysis of Furman and Gregg, see notes 8-65 supra and ac-
companying text.
67 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d 662, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 889 (1963).
68 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
69 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
70 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
71 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1978); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
See also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
72 358 U.S. 576, 586, 587 (1959). See Note, The Death Penalty---The Alternatives Left
After Furman v. Georgia, 37 ALB. L. REv. 344, 349 (1973).
73 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral
grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment-and
they are forceful-the death penalty has been employed throughout our
history, and, in a day when it is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to
violate the constitutional concept of cruelty.
74
Again, in McGautha v. California, Justice Black expressed recognition of the
constitutionality of capital punishment in a concurring opinion:
The Eighth Amendment forbids "cruel and unusual punishments." In my
view, these words cannot be read to outlaw capital punishment because that
punishment was in common use and authorized by law here and in other
countries from which our ancestors came at the time the Amendment was
adopted, 5
This long-term approval, both implicit and explicit, was summed up suc-
cinctly in Furman by Chief Justice Burger:
In the 181 years since the enactment of the Eighth Amendment, not a
single decision of this Court has cast the slightest shadow of a doubt on the
constitutionality of a capital punishment."r
Those who hailed Furman as outlawing the death penalty were obviously wrong,
and those who were confident that Gregg would declare it unconstitutional per se
were also disappointed. In the march of constitutional history, however, Furman
and Gregg were right in line. Whatever hopes of abolition still exist,"7 one should
not expect that the constitutionality per se of the death penalty will be reversed
in the near future.
On the general question of what constitutes "cruel and unusual" punish-
ment, the Court has made a number of rulings. Punishments must not inflict
unnecessary "cruelty""8 or "pain" ;- nor must they involve treatment that is "in-
74 Id. at 99.
75 402 U.S. at 226 (1971).
76 408 U.S. at 380 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
77 One of the latest expressions, stimulated by Justice Powell's issuance of stays of execu-
tion regarding the Gregg case and its companion cases, was by columnist Tom Wicker. He
claimed the people really do not support the "repugnant means" of execution even though they
might say they favor capital punishment and, incidentally, the United States will suffer from
adverse international public opinion if it resumes executions, especially of the "poor and black."
N. Y. Times, July 25, 1976, § 4, at 7, col. 1.
If an editorial comment is permitted, Wicker and others of his view, might better under-
stand why the majority of the people of Georgia support the death penalty, as evidenced through
their laws and the actions of their juries and courts, if they would familiarize themselves with
even the bare recital of the facts in these types of cases as contained in the Georgia Reports. I
especially recommend, McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S.E.2d 577 (1974), even
though some of the facts are missing. The means used by McCoquodale to execute his victim,
who enjoyed none of the protection of due process of law, were far more "repugnant" than any
means ever devised by the state.
The Georgia Supreme Court said of this case:
In no case we have reviewed has the depravity of the defendant and the torture of the
victim exceeded that established by the evidence . . . in this case.
Id. at 377-78, 211 S.E.2d at 583.
The United States Supreme Court, which recently denied certiorari in this case, called it"a horrifying torture-murder." 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2938 (1976).
78 Wilkinson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
79 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
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humane and barbarous.""0 Each punishment should be "graduated and pro-
portioned to the offense."'" No punishment should violate the "dignity of man"
as it is defined by the "evolving standards of decency" of society."2 Moreover, a
punishment which was "universally thought" in the "light of contemporary
knowledge" to be cruel and unusual has been voided. 3
The import of these rulings is that the Court will strike down the application
of punishments which are contrary to the public consensus or which are dis-
proportionate to the offense.
Robinson v. California explicitly made the eighth amendment applicable
to the States through the fourteenth amendment,84 but it was not until nearly ten
years later that the Court accepted and ruled on the issue of the death penalty's
constitutionality under the eighth amendment, limited to questions of procedure
in Furman, but per se in Gregg.
Much of the dicta from the rulings cited appear in the briefs for petitioners
and in the opinions in Furman and Gregg. In these and other cases, opponents
made a concentrated effort to prove that the death penalty was cruel and un-
usual under each and every one of these standards. In this battle, opponents em-
ployed statistical "proof," logical and illogical arguments, propaganda techniques
and whatever other means they could devise. In Furman their goal appeared in
sight, as Justices Brennan and Marshall virtually adopted their arguments and
other justices leaned toward them. But ultimately, all but Justices Brennan and
Marshall retreated, and in Gregg, the Court held that capital punishment for
murder was not per se disproportionate to the crime and that the death penalty
for murder was consistent with the presently evolved standards of decency, as
indicated by overwhelming public support.
In sum, then, Gregg follows Furman and both fit logically into the patterns
of constitutional history with regard to the question of per se constitutionality of
the death penalty and the issue of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
V. Conclusion
This analysis of whether Gregg and Furman are compatible with each other
and with precedent has centered on the related questions of the State's inherent
right to take the life of a convicted murderer, the constitutionality of the death
sentence per se, and the issue of jury discretion.
It appears from hindsight that Furman implicitly upheld the State's power.
Furthermore, Furman was interpreted as not condemning capital punishment by
the overwhelming majority of the states affected. Moreover, Gregg specifically
upheld, at least for the crime of murder, what Furman had only implied for both
murder and rape. Lastly, both Gregg and Furman, in the main, are consistent
with constitutional precedents.
In dealing with the problem of jury discretion, Furman held that the prac-
80 In reKemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
81 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
82 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
83 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
84 Id. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963).
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tice of allowing juries in capital cases to determine sentence with virtually com-
plete freedom was unconstitutional. This was ruled a violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment incorporating the eighth amendment.
In responding to this, the majority of the states misinterpreted the rather
confusing opinions in Furman and adopted mandatory statutes. A minority of
the states, perhaps more sensitive to the implications in Furman that mandatory
sentence laws would be acceptable, drew up limited discretion statutes. Georgia,
exemplary of this, has had its interpretation vindicated in the Gregg decision.
